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I am pleased to be chairing this morning's hearing on the important civil rights issue of compelled political speech. This is an issue that is largely overlooked, perhaps intentionally, by so-called campaign finance reform advocates, their political allies and their admirers in the media. Since this is a novel issue for many and one that is often obscured, let me take a moment to explain what is meant by "compelled speech" and why it is an issue of constitutional significance--a civil rights issue--that Congress must address.

Over two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson said that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical." This principal is the natural corollary of freedom of speech and association. Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment rights of citizens are violated when the law dictates that men and women associate with and subsidize the political and ideological agenda of organizations--against their will and as a condition of employment.

Admittedly, there are few situations where the law dictates that individuals associate with an organization. In fact, I am aware of only two: The first is states with integrated bar associations that attorneys must join and pay dues to as a condition of practicing law. The second is the twenty-nine closed shop states in which workers at unionized job sites must pay fees to the union as a condition of employment, even if they choose not to join the union.

In both scenarios, the subjects of legally-dictated association cannot be required to pay fees beyond those germane to the important state interests justifying the forced association. In the case of bar associations, objecting members cannot be forced to pay dues beyond those necessary to educate and maintain discipline of the legal profession. In the case of closed shop union agreements, objecting non-union workers cannot be forced to pay dues beyond those related to collective bargaining.

Although some may argue that compelled association is itself perverse, what is truly obscene is the process for objecting to unconstitutionally compelled speech. The logical course would be to have objectors pay the actual costs of activities related to organizational purposes justifying the forced association and nothing more. But the logical course is not the actual course. The current regime mandates that objectors pay for all activities, including political and ideological activities unrelated to the core functions, and then go to war with the organization to get a refund of the misused dues. It is left to the individual to battle with the organization, be it a union or bar association, over what percentage of funds were spent on core activities versus unrelated political and ideological activities.

It is well documented that this process often subjects individuals to lengthy litigation and large legal bills, as well as harassment and intimidation. There is no shortage of cases where it takes objectors two, three or even five years to get an accurate refund. Frankly, the process is so burdensome that it amounts to little more than punishment for people simply trying to protect their civil rights. So today we will look at what can be done to improve the process by which citizens vindicate their First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.

Having made clear what the constitutional doctrine of compelled speech covers, let me take a moment to make clear what it does not cover.

First, it does not encompass what is referred to as "voluntary unionism." In the twenty-one so-called "right-to-work" states, the law gives workers at unionized job sites a choice between joining the union and not joining the union. Those who don't join pay no dues or fees while continuing their employment. There is no issue of unconstitutionally compelled speech.

Although association with the union in so called "right-to-work" states may not in fact be truly voluntary because of coercion and intimidation, as Senator Nickles has forcefully (and in my opinion persuasively) argued, the absence of state action compelling the association prevents this from being unconstitutionally compelled speech. That does not mean that we should not address such coercion and intimidation through measures such as paycheck protection, it just means that it is not an issue of constitutional dimensions.

The same is true of membership organizations such as the Sierra Club and the NRA. Individuals join and pay dues to these organizations voluntarily, not as a result of a legal mandate. If they don't like what the group is doing they are free to cease their financial support and disassociate at any time. Those who disassociate do not lose their jobs.

This also the case with corporate shareholders. The law never compels people to associate with a corporation by purchasing stock in a public company. And history proves that shareholders are perfectly free to disassociate with a corporation that does things they find abhorrent or repugnant, whether its is investing in South Africa during apartheid or utilizing labor in nations that do not respect workers' rights.

Let me make clear that today's hearing is not aimed at "union" bashing. I do not desire to silence organized labor's voice in the political arena. To the extent unions utilize voluntarily- contributed dues to push their issues and back their candidates, I think they do the nation a great service. Unions enhance the quality of our democracy by registering voters and educating union members and other citizens about issues -- just as groups like the NRA, the Sierra Club and the ACLU do. And if measures that silence union issue advocacy are ever enacted into law, I will race the AFL-CIO to the courthouse door to challenge these speech suppression schemes as violations of the First Amendment.

Today, I am concerned not with unions spending to promote their agenda, but rather the extent to which fees paid by non-union members who disagree with Labor's political and ideological agenda are used to subsidize that agenda.

Aside from meaningful paycheck protection, the best way I can think of to protect workers from being forced to subsidize political speech with which they disagree is to ensure that they get an annual report of the ideological and political causes unions are supporting with their dues and fees. In that vein, I plan to introduce the Worker Information and Empowerment Act to make it easier for workers to determine if they want to continue subsidizing the union's non-bargaining related activities or whether they want to seek a refund. Let me be clear, this is not reporting to the public at large, but only reporting to those people whose funds are being controlled and spent by the unions. A full, honest and easy-to-comprehend accounting of union expenditures will empower all workers.

In closing, let me say that it is my hope that today instead of posturing and cynically trying to confuse and avoid discussion of the constitutionally significant civil rights issue of compelled speech with distractions about voluntary unionism, membership organizations and corporate shareholders, we can have a meaningful discussion about the problem of unconstitutionally compelled speech and ways to provide meaningful protections and redress for victims of compelled speech. For even the most naive and deluded cannot honestly assert that the current patina of protections against compelled speech is a workable and responsible way to protect First Amendment rights.